Justice and the regulation of social relations: when and why do group members deny claims to social goods?
When do group members withhold monetary resources, abandon procedural protections, and deny fair and respectful treatment to potential claimants? Two experiments investigated the conditions that influence judgments about others' entitlement to these three social goods. Past research suggests that exchange concerns underlie entitlement judgments such that an instrumentally beneficial relationship will promote greater support for claims to social goods. Drawing from group-value theory (Lind & Tyler, 1988), an alternative hypothesis is proposed which suggests that entitlement judgments are motivated by concerns about preserving the core norms and values that comprise the group's identity. The findings support the group-value hypothesis that discrimination in entitlement judgments is motivated by social identity concerns. Furthermore, this tendency to discriminate against those who challenge the group's core norms and values is moderated by the nature of the social good. The effect is strongest with regard to judgments about economic goods (money) and is attenuated with regard to judgments about procedural goods (procedural protection) and especially relational goods (fair and respectful treatment). It is suggested that the level of discrimination exhibited in the domain of procedural and relational goods is kept in check by culturally rooted beliefs that these social goods should be distributed according to egalitarian principles.